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UNLOCKING EXCHANGES 
Brendan S. Maher ?
***
The fate of the Affordable Care Act is uncertain.  Moreover, the 
nation is in an unusual state of political turmoil and may have no appetite 
for anything other than revolutionary changes to the ACA, if not its outright 
repeal.  But press reports suggest even Republican officials formerly 
committed to its extirpation are now thinking instead about a measured path 
forward.
If so, one fact about the ACA should not escape the attention of 
serious reformers: the legislation has already accomplished the difficult task 
of laying the ground work for a move away from employment-based (EB) 
insurance, a move scholars have urged for years.  That said, not all features 
of employment-based insurance are undesirable, and certain reforms to the 
ACA could preserve those desirable features while nonetheless guiding the 
nation away from a flawed system.  
For largely (but not entirely) political reasons, the ACA made it 
difficult for those receiving or providing EB insurance to migrate to the 
individual exchanges the Act took great pains to create.  Yet if there is 
political will to modify the employer mandate and adjust the tax treatment of 
insurance purchases, access to the individual exchanges could be cautiously 
“unlocked,” and millions could migrate from EB insurance to individual, 
exchange-based insurance.  With certain additional reforms, there is reason 
to believe that migration will lead to stronger, healthier exchanges; to a 
reduced regulatory burden on employers; to a clearer stakeholder 
understanding of the relationship between health insurance and wages; and 
perhaps a diminished need to rely on the controversial individual mandate, 
with individual States making that final assessment.
                             ***
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fate of the Affordable Care Act1 is uncertain.  Moreover, the 
nation is in an unusual state of political turmoil and may have no appetite for 
anything other than revolutionary changes to the ACA, if not its outright 
repeal.  But press reports suggest even Republican officials formerly 
committed to its extirpation are now thinking instead about a measured path 
forward.2
                                                                                                                
1 The Affordable Care Act consists of both the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029.  I refer to them jointly as the “ACA.”
N.B.: This article was conceived before Donald Trump was elected, and 
largely finished in early 2017.  To say the period since President Trump’s 
election and inauguration has been turbulent—both in terms of politics and 
policy—would be an understatement.  I have not meaningfully revised this 
paper since then, having given up trying to predict the future.  I thus consider 
this piece as much a time capsule as an idea.
2 Virtually every day, reports surface of reform proposals being 
considered by influential Republicans. See, e.g., Susan Cornwell, Some U.S. 
House Republicans Doubtful Ahead of Vote to Begin Obamacare Repeal, 
REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2017, 1:42AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-usa-
obamacare/some-u-s-house-republicans-doubtful-ahead-of-vote-to-begin-
obamacare-repeal-idUSKBN14W0MC; Mike DeBonis, Anxious lawmakers
to GOP Leaders: What’s the Plan to Replace Obamacare?, WASH. POST A1, 
A1 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ powerpost/anxious-
lawmakers-to-gop-leaders-whats-the-plan-to-replace-
obamacare/2017/01/12/bdbea6bc-d8e1-11e6-9a361d296534b31e_story.
html?utm_term=.cbc6028fee7f; Juliet Eilperin and Amy Goldstein, A Divided 
White House Still Offers Little Guidance on Replacing Obamacare, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 26, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/a-
divided-white-house-still-offers-little-guidance-on-replacing-obamacare/2017/02 
/26/3981bb8c-fb8c-11e6be051a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.f209578e21 
57; Caitlin Huey-Burns & James Arkin, GOP Governors Worried About 
Obamacare Repeal, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Jan. 20, 2017), http:// 
www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2017/01/20/gop_governors_worried_about_o
bamacare_repeal.html; Sarah Kliff, The Leaked Republican Plan to Replace 
Obamacare, Explained, VOX (Feb 24, 2017, 1:20 PM) http://www.vox.com/ 
policy-and-politics/2017/2/24/14726916/leakedrepublican-obamacare 
replacement-plan-explained. Admittedly, by the time this Article is 
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If so, one fact about the ACA should not escape the attention of 
serious reformers: the legislation has already accomplished the difficult task 
of laying the groundwork for a move away from employment-based (EB) 
insurance, a move scholars have urged for years.  That said, not all features 
of EB insurance are undesirable, and certain reforms to the ACA could 
preserve those desirable features while nonetheless guiding the nation away 
from a flawed system.
For largely (but not entirely) political reasons, the ACA made it 
difficult for those receiving or providing EB insurance to migrate to the 
individual exchanges the Act took great pains to create.  Yet, if there is 
political will to modify the “employer mandate” and adjust the tax treatment 
of insurance purchases, access to the individual exchanges could be 
cautiously “unlocked,” and millions could migrate from EB insurance to 
individual, exchange insurance.  With certain additional reforms, there is 
reason to believe that migration will lead to stronger, healthier exchanges; to 
a reduced regulatory burden on employers; to a clearer stakeholder 
understanding of the relationship between health insurance and wages; and, 
perhaps, a diminished need to rely on the controversial individual mandate, 
with individual States making that final assessment. 
In Part II, I give some necessary background about individual and 
employment-based health insurance.  In Part III, I describe how EB systems 
are best thought of as a form of government intervention to remedy market 
failures concerning the quantity, quality, or distribution of some socially 
desirable good, and describe the case for and against EB health insurance.  
In Part IV.A, I explain how the Affordable Care Act undertook a series of 
reforms to create insurance exchanges that would make previously deficient 
individual insurance markets stable, accessible, affordable, and 
comprehensible.  In Part IV.B, I explain how and why Congress took 
legislative steps to forestall migration from the EB system to the newly-
created individual exchanges.  In Part V, I consider the preliminary case for 
taking regulatory steps to promote (rather than hinder) migration from EB 
insurance to exchange insurance, and then consider objections.  In Part VI, I 
sketch two reform suggestions intended to encourage, or at least permit, 
migration to the exchanges.  
                                                                                                                
published, the ACA may have already been reformed, or perhaps repealed.  
But whether such legislative action includes or ignores what is discussed 
herein, the Article will stand as a defense or criticism of what was done.
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II. INSURANCE & EB BASICS
The United States is unique among advanced economies in its 
approach to health care.  It uses a combination of public insurance programs 
and private insurance to finance, and thus deliver, care.3 While the elderly 
and the poor receive health care through public financing models (Medicare 
and Medicaid), persons outside those groups rely on private insurance to 
finance care, and they largely rely on a special type of private insurance: EB 
insurance.  I discuss below some necessary basics of both individual and EB 
insurance.
A. INSURANCE BASICS
Insurance is an ancient means to trade and spread risk.4  Because the 
risk-averse insured fears the possibility of a large, unexpected loss, he is willing 
to pay the insurer a small, fixed amount (the premium) in return for the insurer 
agreeing to cover the loss if it occurs.  The risk deal between the two is set forth 
in an insurance “policy.”
For a policy to be profitable for insurer, the premiums it collects (plus 
the investment return it earns on those premiums) must exceed the payouts 
associated with covered loss events. To charge a fair price for a policy, the insurer 
need engage in “underwriting,” i.e., it must determine, the best it can, the 
likelihood and magnitude the loss events it is agreeing to insure a particular 
insured for.5   Underwriting is a difficult task, even for insurance companies, 
because the true risk an insured poses can be different than the risk one would 
assign to the insured based on an evaluation of information the insurer has access 
to through underwriting.6
                                                                                                                
3 See Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the 
Constitution: How States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA,
31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275, 282 (2013) (explaining and noting the 
prevalence of the “Medi-” and private insurance models).
4 See generally C.F. TRENERRY, THE ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF 
INSURANCE (1926) (describing insurance-like arrangements beginning 
millennia ago).
5 43 AM. JUR. 2D INSURANCE § 2 (explaining underwriting and risk 
transfer).
6 See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based 
Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 23, 32 (2001) 
(explaining underwriting).
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The problem is complicated by adverse selection, which is the term 
for the idea that those seeking to obtain insurance are those most likely to 
incur losses.  Asymmetric information makes adverse selection dangerous.  
Because an insurer often has less information than a potential insured about 
the actual risk the insured poses, the insurer may charge an insufficiently 
high premium and incur losses on the policy.   Should the insurer attempt to 
raise premiums the next time around, the higher premium may drive away 
potential insureds who lack the hidden risk justifying the higher premium, 
thus making the pool of insureds the insurer attracts riskier (and more costly 
to the insurer) overall.7 Adverse selection can damage or destroy insurance 
markets.8
Health insurance is particularly challenging to underwrite.  As 
opposed to other forms of insurance, where the likelihood and magnitude of 
loss events is relatively easier to calculate and predict (and thus price), health 
insurance is difficult to underwrite and issue.9 Even putting aside 
                                                                                                                
7 In a now-classic article, Professor Peter Siegelman explained that 
adverse selection’s threat to insurance markets often may be overemphasized 
by observers. See generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance 
Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (concluding 
that propitious selection—an alternative method of selection—may be at 
least as common as adverse selection).  That said, the consensus view is that 
adverse selection is a nontrivial threat to health insurance markets, and 
Siegelman’s article did point to some clear examples of adverse selection in 
health insurance.
8 JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 311-13
(2005) (explaining perils of adverse selection). The same is not true of 
broccoli markets, which is why that particular analogy, although colorful, 
was of limited appeal to insurance scholars who were following the famous 
NFIB v. Sebelius case involving, inter alia, the reach of the Commerce 
Clause. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. 519, 615 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
dissenting in part) (rejecting broccoli analogy).
9 Cf. Jayanta Bhattacharya & William B. Vogt, Employment and Adverse 
Selection in Health Insurance 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 12430, 2006) (acknowledging a widespread belief by economists 
that employment “ameliorates the adverse selection problem in health 
insurance provision”).
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underwriting challenges, the rising cost of health care also makes health 
insurance expensive.10
As a result, unlike markets in other goods, insurance markets (and 
particularly health insurance markets) need to be regulated with care.  In the 
wild, health insurance markets are likely to be unstable, and market forces 
alone will probably not guarantee that insurance will be affordable and 
available to those whose need it.11 And health insurance is not an ordinary 
good.  Because of the high cost of health care, insurance is the sole practical 
means to privately pay for most care, and thus the sole practical means to 
ensure, without recourse to the public fisc or charity, that people’s most basic 
needs—health and life—are addressed.  There is thus a considerable societal 
interest in ensuring that people have access to some insurance mechanism to 
finance care.
Interestingly, in the United States, until the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act, the primary regulatory response to addressing the 
problems of the individual health insurance market was to sidestep the issue.  
This was accomplished by relying on insurance provided in connection with 
one’s job—i.e., “employment-based insurance”—to finance care for 
Americans outside of public programs like Medicare and Medicaid.12 To the 
EB world I turn to next.
                                                                                                                
10 As for why health care is expensive, the explanations are many.  See, 
e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to 
Fix It: An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 537, 
547-49 (2006) (tying high cost of care to a variety of causes); Mark V. Pauly, 
The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535-
36 (1968) (theorizing that moral hazard in health insurance leads to upward 
price pressure).
11 See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United 
States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 574-77 (2008) (describing individual 
market as inhospitable and unaffordable); Peter Diamond, Organizing the 
Health Insurance Market, 60 ECONOMETRICA 1233, 1236-37 (1992) 
(describing inability of high risk persons obtain affordable coverage in 
individual markets).
12 Indeed, prior to the Affordable Care Act, many people were saved 
from being exposed to the vicissitudes of the individual market by COBRA, 
which was enacted to allow those who had left a job with insurance to 
continue to buy into the employer policy for a period of time. Thus, the prior 
Congressional effort to deal with individual insurance market infirmity was 
not to solve individual market problems, but merely to use EB insurance to 
more aggressively sidestep the problem.    
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B. EB BASICS
EB insurance is far more than a fringe work benefit.  It is massive in 
size and regulatory scope, covering over 150 million people and occupying 
countless pages of the United States Code, including the Internal Revenue 
Code, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and 
the Affordable Care Act.
The historical justification for the rise of EB insurance is well 
known: during World War II, wages were subject to wartime price controls, 
but benefits were not.13 Providing benefits (including health insurance) thus 
allowed employers to compete for workers by increasing their compensation 
without increasing their wages.14 The provision of health insurance through 
the workplace proved popular, and by the time of the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act in 2010, EB health insurance was a familiar fact of life 
to most Americans.15
The theoretical appeal of EB insurance is a subject that has received 
uneven treatment.  Part of that is attributable to the underlying evolution of 
both health care and insurance.  Health insurance in the form we recognize 
it today—paying a premium to ensure that one could receive paid-for 
medical care—began in the late 1920s, less than ninety years ago.16 Medical 
care at the time was both far less effective and far less costly than today, and 
so the need to ensure proper financing for it was less pressing.17 But as the 
practice of medicine modernized and became more effective, health care 
                                                                                                                
13 See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, in THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
PERSPECTIVES 3-4 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2002) (explaining the relevance of 
wartime wage controls).
14 Id.
15 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AND JCT'S ESTIMATES OF THE 
EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE 
OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE tbl.2 (2012), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-
2012/reports/03-15-ACA_and_Insurance_2.pdf (estimating that over 150 
million people would receive EB insurance in 2012). 
16 See Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-
Provided Health Insurance, 117 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4-5 (1994).
17 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
MEDICINE 259-60 (1982) (describing the transformation of medical services 
in the early twentieth century).
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costs began to rise.  And while the rate of health care cost increases had 
begun to become worrisome by the early 1970s, the scope of the problem 
was not broadly appreciated until later.  For example, at the time of the 
enactment of ERISA in 1974, Congress was not convinced that either health 
care costs or health insurance was in crisis.18 By the late 1970s, however, 
health care costs were rising fast enough to earn front-page treatment and 
warnings of catastrophe.19
Like health care, insurance (and thinking about insurance) was also 
evolving.  “Major-medical” policies (policies that covered treatment for most 
conditions) did not start to become widely offered until the 1950s; 
previously, health insurance covered only a narrow set of conditions, often 
those attributable to an injury suffered while working.20 And, while insurers 
had been aware of the possibility of adverse selection for decades, only in 
the 1970s did formal theoretical treatments of the subject appear.21 These 
                                                                                                                
18 Congress believed that “there was no crisis in health plans in 1974.” 
Michael S. Gordon, Introduction to the Second Edition: ERISA in the 21st 
Century, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW lxiii, lxviii (Steven J. Sacher et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2000). Yet health costs were already growing at accelerating 
rates.  See, e.g., Walter W. Kolodrubetz, Two Decades of Employee-Benefit 
Plans, 1950-70: A Review, 35 SOC. SEC. BULL. 10, 15 (1972) (reporting that 
by 1970 “[t]he inflation of medical costs ... left its imprint on the rapidly 
increasing [EB] expenditures for health care benefits”).
19 See, e.g., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A 
PRIMER 4-5 (2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.c/2013/01/7670-
03.pdf (showing the rise in health care costs between 1960 and 2010); E. Kash Rose, 
Bringing Costs Under Control, 126 WESTERN J. MED. 513 (1977) (“Between 1950 
and 1976, the cost of a day in the hospital climbed five times as fast as the general 
inflation rate, reaching an average of $175 last year, up from $16 a day in 1950.”).
20 See Scofea, supra note 16 at 3-4; see also Louis S. Reed, Private Health 
Insurance in the United States: An Overview, SOC. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1965, at 3-
21, 48, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v28n12/v28n12p3.pdf.
21 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). While 
not treated formally, adverse selection had been in the insurance vernacular 
since at least the mid-19th century. See, e.g., G.E. Currie, THE UNITED 
STATES INSURANCE GAZETTE AND MAGAZINE OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE 
132 (1869) (discussing adverse selection in life insurance policies). The first 
model of adverse selection in insurance markets was offered in 1976. 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
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theoretical tools provided observers with the tools to identify and catalogue 
the flaws of providing health insurance through private markets—whether 
individual or through the workplace.
While the story is more complex than described above, for a number 
of reasons—such as rising health care costs and the development of a more 
sophisticated understanding of health insurance markets—it was surprisingly 
late that the comparative worth of EB health insurance was evaluated and 
scrutinized by disciplined observers. Those evaluations, nonetheless, were 
largely disapproving.22 That negative critical consensus motivated many 
commentators to explain the United States’ then (and now) large scale 
reliance on EB health insurance not as something that made objective sense, 
but instead as an “accident of history.”23
Scholarly disapproval of EB insurance, however, was not matched 
by a political or public desire to abandon it.  Indeed, the prevailing view in 
the run-up to the Affordable Care Act was to the contrary: the public 
attachment to EB insurance was thought sufficiently strong that legislative 
                                                                                                                
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J.
ECON. 629 (1976).
22 See e.g., Nancy S. Jecker, Can an Employer-based Health Insurance 
System Be Just?, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 657 (1993) (arguing that EB 
insurance is inherently unjust); Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, 
Health Insurance and Job Mobility: The Effects of Public Policy on Job-
Lock, 48 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 86, 88 (1994) (EB insurance produces 
significant “job-lock”); David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: 
What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 227, 
233-34 (2000) (EB insurance causes misaligned incentives between 
employers and employees); see generally David S. Caroline, Employer
Health-Care Mandates: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong Question, 11 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 427 (2009) (discussing EB insurance’s poor ability to provide 
broad coverage); Meir Katz, Towards a New Moral Paradigm in Health 
Care Delivery: Accounting for Individuals, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 78, 82 
(2010) (EB insurance limits employees’ options and negotiating power);
Allison K. Hoffman, An Optimist’s Take on the Decline of Small-Employer 
Health Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 113, 123 (2013) (EB insurance is 
not portable and brings personal health matters into the workplace).
23 David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the 
United States—Origins and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82 
(2006) (referring to the “many accounts” that have described the United 
States’ embrace of EB insurance as “an accident of history”).
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moves to undermine it were seen as politically perilous.24 This likely 
(although not entirely) explains the curiously schizophrenic nature of the 
ACA, namely, the legislation created a regulatory super-structure that—by 
solving certain problems for those outside the EB health insurance system—
could easily have served as a platform to transition most of the nation away 
from EB insurance to a different (but still private) system of insurance.  But 
that did not occur—because Congress took steps to ensure that it would not.  
To that we will return.
III. THEORIZING EB INSURANCE
As mentioned above, on balance the scholarly consensus has long 
been that EB insurance is an undesirable way for a society to pay for health 
care for its members.25 But a conclusion that EB insurance is suboptimal is 
insufficient for our purposes here; when considering reform, it is preferable 
to be specific about what a disfavored approach does wrong, as well as—
importantly—to acknowledge what it does right.
In previous work, I developed a framework that helps clarify the 
positives and negatives of using an employment-based mechanism to 
provide any socially desirable good, compared to using alternative regulatory 
approaches to do so.26 With some adjustments suitable for the special 
characteristics of EB health insurance, I follow that approach here. 
A. EB SYSTEMS AS REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS
Markets are imperfect.   Sometimes they are imperfect with respect 
to goods that are especially socially desirable—pensions, health care, home 
                                                                                                                
24 See Chad Terhune & Laura Meckler, A Turning Point for Health Care,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2007, at A1 (“In an interview last week, Sen. Hillary 
Rodham Clinton said people aren't ready to cross employers out of the 
equation. . . . ‘There's great attachment to the employer-based system, even 
though it is eroding.’”); Uwe R. Reinhardt, Is Employer-Based Health 
Insurance Worth Saving?, N.Y. TIMES, (May 22, 2009, 6:05 AM), https://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/is-employer-based-health-
insurance-worth-saving/?_r=0.
25 See Blumenthal, supra note 23, at 82.
26 See generally Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based 
Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1257 (2016).
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mortgages, education, etc.27 We might say that, for a given socially desirable 
good, a market may fail to (1) offer enough of the good at an accessible price; 
(2) provide a version of the good that is of sufficient quality; or (3) make that 
good available in sufficient amount or quality to certain segments of the 
population.  
In response, the government has several options.  One option is to 
do nothing.  Another is for the government to provide the good in question 
itself.  A third option is to regulate private markets (or private players in 
those markets) in the hopes of improving the quantity, quality, or distribution 
of the good.  EB approaches are simply particular species of that third 
category; instead of regulating “open market” transactions regarding those 
goods, the government regulates (through both carrots and sticks) the 
provision of those goods as a component of the labor deal.   Examples of EB 
regulations include tax incentives, deal prohibitions, funding requirements, 
liability standards, and damage limitations.28
Whether the government is right to choose to use an EB system—as 
opposed to some other regulatory intervention—is a complex subject 
incapable of resolution here.  However, methodically thinking about why a 
government might reasonably believe an EB approach is desirable can serve 
as a useful conceptual accounting of what an EB approach might do well and 
what it might do poorly.  That accounting can, in a reasonably tidy fashion, 
be compared to a similarly organized review of an alternative regulatory 
approach.
Below I consider why, compared to not intervening in the market for 
health insurance at all, an EB approach might seem attractive.   I then 
consider the shortcomings of an EB insurance approach. 
B. THE PRELIMINARY CASE FOR EB HEALTH INSURANCE
Compared to an unregulated market, the general case for using an 
employment-based mechanism to improve the quantity, quality or 
distribution of any socially desirable good can be summarized as follows.  
EB mechanisms improve market problems by leveraging the advantages of 
group purchasing; by relying on employers as sophisticated agents; by using 
the labor deal as a behavioral fulcrum to focus attention and reduce the 
                                                                                                                
27 Socially desirable goods are “those goods for which there is broad 
agreement that society is better off if most individuals have or are able to 
obtain them.” Id. at 1276.
28 All of these are used under ERISA.  See generally PETER J.
WEIDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW (2010).
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likelihood of poor decision-making; and by utilizing employers and the labor 
deal as a convenient regulatory nexus.29 All of these arguments apply with 
some force in the health insurance context.  
Group purchasing. The central (although not only) advantage of EB 
health insurance is that it leverages the power of groups to purchase 
insurance.  With respect to any good, bulk purchasing reduces unit cost, but 
with respect to insurance, group purchasing is particularly valuable.  
Using the employee group as the purchasing unit for policies is 
attractive on multiple grounds.  First, it is easier to underwrite and insure a 
group than an individual; the larger the group, the more the risks of the group 
approach the risk of the community, for which reliable rating information is 
available (and for which adverse selection is not an issue).30 Not only does 
this make groups less risky to insure, it gives particularly large groups 
meaningful market power to negotiate.  Put slightly differently, underwriting 
is more difficult (and thus more costly) to do properly the smaller the group.31
The larger the group, the more the group is a prize customer for the insurer, 
and thus the better suited the group is to negotiate attractive deal terms—
e.g., broad doctor networks—that please group members.  Thus, group 
power, combined with sophisticated employees that a large company may 
employ to oversee its insurance purchases, can often result in desirable 
policies whose generous coverage legitimately advantages employees. 
Moreover, current law requires an insurer to offer the same rate for 
the whole group, i.e., to not price discriminate among different risks within 
the group.32 As a result, being a part of the group makes health insurance 
accessible to individuals who otherwise—in an unregulated, open market—
                                                                                                                
29 See Maher, supra note 26, at 1275-90.
30 This assumes that the group is assembled for some reason other than 
to buy insurance; that is obviously the case with employee groups, who are 
assembled by dint of their decision to work for a given employer.  See, e.g.,
Allison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented
Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 28 (2010) (noting that 
there is “little concern of adverse selection with respect to large, employer-
sponsored group insurance”); see also Hyman & Hall, supra note 6.
31See Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer 
Health Insurance, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 1935, 1947-48 (2013) (explaining that 
small groups are riskier to insure). 
32 See Hoffman, supra note 30; See generally Hyman & Hall, supra note 
6.
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would have had to pay a very high price for insurance (or, who, with certain 
conditions, would have been unable to buy insurance at all).33
Sophisticated agents. Insurance, particularly, health insurance, is 
not a simple good to evaluate or purchase.34 An average worker may find 
researching, comparing, and consummating such a purchase to be difficult 
or time-consuming, and might make suboptimal choices.35 In contrast, 
company management is comparatively more sophisticated and has more 
resources to devote to understanding the purchase.36 To the extent EB 
insurance results in leveraging management’s sophistication to legitimately 
aid the employee in insurance procurement, that is a potential advantage over 
leaving employees to attempt to secure health insurance on the open 
market.37
Behavioral economic advantages. Human beings are imperfect 
decision makers who fall victim to systematic errors.38 The purchase of 
complicated goods—such as health insurance, which involves pricing 
contingent events—is a context particularly likely to result in suboptimal 
outcomes like procrastination, refusal to purchase, or purchase by inefficient 
heuristic.39 Tying health insurance to the labor deal increases the likelihood 
                                                                                                                
33 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 22, 27-28 (1971) (explaining how regulation is needed to 
preserve internal subsidization).  This cross-subsidy, of course, is a negative
feature for those who would have paid less on the open market.  But that cost 
might be worthwhile if that person believes, at some point in the future, he 
will benefit from being in the group. 
34 See generally George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ 
Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 851 (2013) 
(consumers do not understand traditional health insurance plans).
35 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1095-100 (2000) (explaining difficulties in choosing health
insurance); cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 47 (2008) (noting consumers are vulnerable because of 
“imperfect information and imperfect rationality”). 
36 See Hyman & Hall supra note 6, at 30 (arguing that with respect to 
health insurance decisions, employers have superior personnel resources).
37 Id.  See also Maher, supra note 26, at 1278-80.
38 See generally DANIEL ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: 
THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); 
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
39 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. 
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that it will be purchased, promotes the likelihood that individuals will pay 
attention to the insurance decision, and increases the chance the investment 
of attention by the employee will be worth it.40
In addition, if we assume that (at least with respect to the insurance 
purchasing decision) employers are less subject to cognitive biases41 than 
individual workers, if the employer presents a default choice, that outcome 
is likely to be better than an individual would obtain on his own.42
                                                                                                                
ECON. REV. 1, 1-19 (1991) (noting how procrastination affects decision-
making); Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 83 (2009) 
(“[T]here is now extensive evidence that most people are disproportionately 
sensitive to small, immediate costs; that is one of the reasons we 
procrastinate even essential tasks.”); Piers Steel, The Nature of 
Procrastination: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review of Quintessential 
Self-Regulatory Failure, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 65, 66 (2007) (considering 
scholarly treatments of procrastination). 
40 To elaborate, one is more likely to purchase an item if that item comes 
with something else than if one had to buy that item on its own. Second, 
people think more about decisions put in front of them; connecting insurance 
to the job essentially forces people to think about insurance when they take 
the job (and perhaps each time they see the paycheck deduction). Third, EB 
insurance is a constrained choice: if one wants insurance, one chooses among 
the options (if any) the employer has provided. That is much more likely to 
result in a decision—and to reward the investment of attention— than is an 
effort to buy health insurance in the open market, which can paralyze 
consumers with too many choices.
41 See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1499, 1515 (1998) (“Because corporations and other business 
associations are so subject to market constraints, there have been long-
standing doubts as to whether psychological biases, even if robust at the
individual level, are likely to have much impact on organized economic 
behavior.”); See also Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How 
Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 
RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1 (1998).
42 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is 
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1196 (2003) (“[T]he more 
complex the decision, the less attractive it will be to force people to choose 
for themselves, as opposed to having the option of . . .  receiving a default 
option that has been selected with some care.”). 
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EB settings can also influence decisions by constraining 
compensation; an employer may offer health insurance but refuse to increase 
wages by an equivalent amount if the employee declines the insurance. One 
way to view constrained compensation is as a commitment device that 
promotes good decisions.  If one realizes that spending money on health 
insurance is the right decision, but worries that the freedom to spend wages 
as one likes will result in consumer electronics instead of health insurance,43
labor deals that come with constrained compensation are welfare-enhancing.
Regulatory amenability. All regulatory interventions must regulate 
some act, and impose upon some party a burden to comply.  Providing health 
insurance through an EB system makes the labor deal the act that is regulated 
and the employer the primary compliance agent.  Because labor deals are 
necessary elements of a market economy, they are unlikely to be abandoned 
if regulated, thereby reducing the chance that a significant segment of the 
population will dodge EB regulation by not working.44 In addition, 
employers have experience as compliance actors; drafting them could be 
more attractive than creating a new compliance structure from scratch (such 
as creating a federal agency to administer a national health service.)45 In 
other words, delivering and regulating health insurance through the work 
place utilizes a pre-existing structure (and familiar actors) as the attachment 
points for the government’s regulatory will.
                                                                                                                
43 See generally Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or 
Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999) (discussing commitment devices). For 
the record, Maher prefers craft beer to consumer electronics, and does not 
believe it is a close call.
44 Maher, supra note 26, at 1288 (“Other bargains (or mere acts), in 
contrast, if burdened with interventionist regulation, might be more readily 
abandoned.”). There could, of course, be some employment effects.
45 Employers have functioned as compliance actors in the context of both 
taxes and immigration status. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and 
“Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1081, 1096-97 (2008) (discussing employer obligations regarding 
employee status); Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of 
Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 677-78 (2006) (praising the 
federal approach to tax collecting, which heavily involves employers, as an 
“unqualified success”).
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C. THE PRELIMINARY CASE AGAINST EB INSURANCE 
Having laid out the potential advantages of EB insurance, in this Part 
III.C. I consider the downsides. 
Self-evident limitations. The first limitation is the most obvious: EB 
health insurance only reaches the employed and their dependents.  Those 
outside the employed population must be reached in some other way. The 
second limitation relates to the labor deal itself: if wages are to be reduced 
to pay for the benefit of health insurance, that tradeoff has limits, based the 
cost of health insurance, the size of the wage, minimum wage laws barring 
wages from dropping below a certain level, and the preference of workers.46
Thus EB health insurance is not only not going to reach non-employees, it is 
also highly unlikely to reach all the employed.  (Mandates47 are not cure-alls, 
as they generally do not reach part-time or “gig” workers.)  Third, while the 
use of group purchasing benefits those who would otherwise be unable to 
purchase insurance on the individual market, it forces those who would have 
been able to do so to pay a higher price as a part of the group.  
Myopic actors. Management may be more sophisticated than labor.  
But at least two concerns undermine one’s confidence that that comparative 
sophistication will be deployed to make employees better off.  First, 
employers are not particularly sophisticated regarding health insurance, and 
often rely on third party providers—who are experts with respect to health 
insurance—to strike deals.48 Absent significant regulation, an employer 
could be exploited by a third-party provider, with the result being suboptimal 
insurance for workers.  Put differently, even if employers hope to be good 
agents regarding procuring insurance for their employees, they may be 
victimized at the bargaining table by expert insurers.  
Second, the reality is that insurance is compensation, and on the 
matter of compensation, employers and employees have an adversarial 
                                                                                                                
46 See Maher, supra note 26, at 1292-93.
47 Mandated benefits have their own strengths, weaknesses, and 
employment effects. See Lawrence H. Summers, What can Economics 
Contribute to Social Policy? Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits,
79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (1989).
48 Cf. Russ Banham, The Great Pension Derisking, CFO MAG., Apr. 
2013, at 40, 42, http://ww2.cfo.com/retirement-plans/2013/04/the-great-
pension-derisking/view-all (quoting company executives at General Motors 
explaining that car-making, not benefits, is the company's core competency).
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relationship.49 Employers might be inclined to use their extra sophistication 
to offer health insurance with terms that an employee is unlikely to realize is 
undesirable.  And even to the extent employees do realize that, in non-union 
settings, their power to alter the deal is likely modest.50
Acknowledging employer power is not to impugn the character of 
employers.  But the reality is that employers have objectives, and if the point 
of using an EB system is to deliver health insurance that approaches a version 
of health insurance that society believes is optimal, it is unlikely employers 
will, absent regulation, be inclined to offer health insurance that has those 
characteristics.  And it is unlikely non-unionized employees will have the 
expertise or power to push back.  
Consider the Hobby Lobby case.51 For present purposes, the issue 
can be stated fairly simply.  Society—its preferences embodied in the 
Affordable Care Act’s requirements—determined that health insurance 
should cover contraception.52 The owners of Hobby Lobby, for religious 
reasons, did not wish to offer to their employees insurance that did so.53
While the resulting dispute over that particular insurance term attracted a lot 
of attention, there are many potential terms in insurance policies that 
employers—even those who generally prefer offering insurance as a benefit 
to their employees—might refuse to accept on economic or social grounds.54
Thus, absent regulation that limits what employers can offer employees as 
health insurance, the likelihood that employers will use their additional 
sophistication and superior bargaining power to offer health insurance worse
than what society believes is optimal is significant.
                                                                                                                
49 In addition, the current regulatory set-up assigns liability to the 
employer for health insurance disputes. More generous policies 
correspondingly increase an employer’s liability risk. See Brendan S. Maher 
& Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 460-74 
(2010).
50 Most employees are not unionized.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE: UNION MEMBERS – 2016 (Jan. 27, 
2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (reporting that 10.7
percent of workers are in unions). 
51 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
52 42 U.S.C § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
53 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
54 Examples might include coverage relating to assisted suicide, stem cell 
treatments, pre-natal genetic testing, or surrogate motherhood.  
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Regulatory fragility. While the labor deal might be a resilient 
regulatory target and employers experienced compliance agents, regulating 
employers comes with a cost.  
Employers are not in the business of providing health insurance; they 
are in the business of paying wages to workers to produce widgets or services 
for sale.  To the extent the regulatory burden connected with providing health 
insurance becomes high, employers may choose to not offer it—or, in the 
case of a mandate, structure their affairs such that the mandate’s impact is 
minimized.
The practical consequence is regulations that make offering health 
insurance more onerous—which includes virtually any rule that favors 
employees and beneficiaries—can be met with a credible threat to stop 
offering health insurance.  And because health insurance is very hard to come 
by in the open market—i.e., outside of an EB system, or absent some other 
government intervention—this threat is particularly powerful in the health 
insurance context.55 Employers thus hold tremendous leverage with 
regulators (and implicitly with the judges charged with interpreting the 
rules), and the result is that EB health insurance systems come with an 
inherent bias against regulators (and employees) in favor of employers.56
Opacity. EB health insurance obscures the reality of health 
insurance in multiple ways.  First, because health insurance is an 
employment benefit, the cost of the health insurance is generally obscured to 
the worker—at least as compared to how clear the cost would be if the 
worker acquired health insurance on the open market.57 There is no finer 
mechanism for making clear the cost of something than to ask the person 
purchasing it to write a check equal to its cost.  
                                                                                                                
55 And those threats will have even more force in difficult economic 
times—precisely when health insurance is most needed—because that is 
when employers will be looking to trim costs, including by shedding the 
explicit and implicit costs of regulatory compliance.  
56 Several scholars have suggested this is the reason the courts have 
trimmed ERISA’s remedies at every turn. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, The 
Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 649, 
665-67 (2014); Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and 
the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 133-36 (2009).
57 Unlike in the past, now the “employer contribution must be shown on 
an employee’s W-2.” John Aloysius Cogan Jr., Health Insurance Rate 
Review, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 411, 424 (2016) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6051(a) 
(2012)). As Professor Cogan points out, however, “it is not entirely clear that 
all employees fully understand or even notice this information.”  Id.
2017 UNLOCKING EXCHANGES 143
Second, this confusion goes beyond the micro-level.  It is clear that 
many voters do not appreciate that health insurance is paid, not by the 
employer, but by the foregone wages of the employees.58 This means EB 
insurance has support based on a false premise.59 Believing EB insurance is 
paid for by the employer is equivalent to viewing the current system as 
providing workers with a gift.  When one laboring under this 
misapprehension learns alternative health insurance approaches will no 
longer rely on employers, one will conclude that one is “losing” an employer 
gift, and resist any such change, leaving public support of EB insurance 
higher than it should be.  
Third, EB insurance systems are likely to perpetuate mistaken 
beliefs about who deserves health insurance (and thus health care).  
Providing health insurance through the workplace was not done because only 
those employed deserved health insurance and health care; it was done 
because it was held to be an effective way to provide a significant 
population—the employed and their dependents—health care.  But the 
dominance of an EB health insurance approach has led people to confuse 
cause and effect by concluding that health insurance and care are somehow 
morally linked to having a job, even though, upon inspection, that is not the 
case.  No credible moral theory conditions the availability of health insurance 
and care upon having a job with health insurance benefits; that would 
exclude, just to name a few examples that come to mind, the young, the old, 
freelancers, entrepreneurs, the disabled, homemakers, and the unemployed.60
                                                                                                                
58 See Maher, supra note 26, at 1307 (arguing that the public largely 
misunderstands who pays for benefits). Cf. Uwe Reinhardt, The Illogic of 
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/upshot/the-illogic-of-employer-sponsored-
health-insurance.html (Professor Reinhardt argued that the Supreme Court 
itself failed to understand that employees, not employers, pay for benefits.).
59 Cf. Lauren R. Roth, Overvaluing Employer-Sponsored Health 
Insurance, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 633, 647 (2015) (arguing that as a result of 
misunderstandings about EB insurance, “[f]ew doubt that attachment to [EB 
insurance] is a significant impediment to a dramatic overhaul of our 
healthcare system”). Roth also argues that cognitive biases account for the 
nation’s attachment to EB insurance. Id. at 647-48 (arguing that prospect 
theory and the endowment effect illustrate why people are more attached to
EB insurance than is objectively rational).
60 See Maher, supra note 26, at 1295. Cf. Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. 
Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2016) (identifying and criticizing the “perceived divide between good 
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IV. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
Although the ACA changed much about health care in the United 
States, for our purposes, the relevant question is what action it took (and did 
not take) with respect to the regulation of private insurance.61 As explained 
below, the Affordable Care Act took various steps with respect to both 
employment-based health insurance and individual health insurance.  The 
technical particulars are quite complex, and federal agencies enjoy 
considerable power to promulgate implementing regulations.  
For this Article, however, a detailed dive is not necessary. The 
relevant takeaways can be set forth with only modest reference to the 
underlying statutory and regulatory specifics.  The first takeaway is that the
Act implemented a series of reforms to fix the problems that have long 
bedeviled and rendered inaccessible individual insurance markets.  The 
second is that Congress took steps to ensure that fixing the individual 
markets would not undermine the existing EB system.
A. FIXING INDIVIDUAL MARKETS
A central reason for the ACA’s enactment was to achieve near-
universal coverage for Americans. Health care is so costly that it is not 
meaningfully available without some source of financing.  Thus, prior to the 
Affordable Care Act, health care was reliably available only to those that had 
access to private or public insurance, namely the elderly (through Medicare), 
the poor (through Medicaid), or the employed (through EB coverage).  Those 
outside those categories could only obtain insurance through the individual 
market, which was not accessible to most people.  As noted in Part II.A. 
above, individual markets are plagued with administrative and adverse 
selection problems.  The insurance industry response was to refuse to offer 
insurance at all to those with preexisting conditions, and otherwise only offer 
affordable policies to a small set of people.62
                                                                                                                
citizens with private insurance and socially undesirable dependents with 
public benefits.”).
61 Thus, the Act’s expansion of Medicaid, for example, is not of 
immediate concern here. 
62 See Gruber, supra note 11 at 574-77; Diamond, supra note 11 at 1236-
37 (discussing undesirable pre-ACA state of individual markets). See also
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The Act addressed the problems of the individual market through 
several interrelated mechanisms.  First, the ACA barred insurance companies 
from underwriting; any person seeking a policy would be charged the 
community rate, with premiums adjusted only for geographic area, family 
size, age, and tobacco use.63
Second, all individuals were obligated to obtain insurance coverage 
or pay a penalty.64 This “individual mandate” was and is designed to combat 
adverse selection that could destroy insurers writing community rated 
policies. If insurers are required to issue policies to all applicants at 
community rates, many healthy consumers might choose to not buy a policy 
until they were sick or likely to become sick.  In that case, the insurer would 
be writing policies at community rates but only collecting premiums from 
the sicker part of the community, which is not sustainable.  An individual 
mandate, by requiring all people (including healthy ones) to buy policies, 
allows the insurer to offer community rated policies without facing financial 
ruin.
Third, all policies offered must cover roughly the same “essential 
health benefits” that corresponded to ten categories of coverage.65 Those 
categories reflected Congress’s judgment about what a socially valuable 
health insurance policy must cover.  Absent such a requirement, the Act 
risked creating no more than a market for empty policies that were useful 
health insurance in name only.  The law allowed, however, for policies to 
vary in the level of coverage a policy provided.  Policies were assigned colors 
(bronze, silver, gold, and platinum) based on the actuarial percentage of costs 
                                                                                                                
Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care 
Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 134 (2011) 
(observing that “because the risks of some individuals can be difficult to 
predict or are predictably exorbitant” insurers may “refus[e] to insure certain 
individuals or insur[e] them only with respect to specific types of costs or 
conditions.”).
63 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A) (2012) (listing the permitted rating 
factors); id. at §300gg-4 (prohibiting discrimination based on pre-existing 
conditions). Community rates are set by state regulation, and are intended to 
reflect a fair price to insure an average member of the community.
64 See I.R.C. § 5000A (2012) (individual mandate).
65 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (2012) (providing that individual and small 
group plans must provide “essential health benefits”). The ACA also requires 
other consumer protections, such as no lifetime limits. 
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they would cover for an average patient.66 This kind of standardization often 
does not occur in markets operating on their own; thus, this reform can be 
thought of not only as one regulating quality but also as one that makes 
consumer choice easier. 
Fourth, Congress did not create an unfunded individual mandate.  
Given the high cost of health care, for many even a community-rated policy 
is unaffordable.  As a result, sliding subsidies were offered to enable low 
income persons, i.e., those whose income is 400% or less of the poverty line, 
to purchase insurance.67
Fifth, the ACA created insurance “exchanges” where customers 
could choose between policies, and where the relevant information regarding 
policy specifics was to be provided in an accessible, consistent way.68 The 
exchanges were to be run either by the State or the federal government, if the 
State declined to do so.
The foregoing changes were intended to fix the individual insurance 
markets by making them stable, accessible, affordable, and comprehensible.  
B. LOCKING INDIVIDUAL EXCHANGES
Market economies are dynamic and change in response to 
legislation.  As a result, some feared the ACA’s reforms would result in some 
employers no longer offering health insurance as a benefit to their workers.
Offering health insurance imposes significant administrative, 
regulatory, and liability costs upon employers.69 Prior to the ACA’s reforms 
                                                                                                                
66 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d) (2012). The ACA also included reinsurance 
mechanisms to protect insurers who entered the markets as they equilibrated. 
See generally Mark A. Hall, The Three Types of Reinsurance Created by 
Federal Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1168 (2010) (explaining the ACA's 
reinsurance provisions).
67 Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health 
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1947-48 (2013) (explaining ACA 
purchase subsidies). The subsidies are only available to if one is unemployed 
or if one’s employer does not provide “minimum essential coverage.” I.R.C. 
§ 36B(2)(C) (2012). That requirement pertains to affordability and value, not 
the benefit package.
68 Brendan S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchanges: 
Choice, Defaults, and the Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099, 1107 
(2012) (explaining how the exchanges simplified insurance purchasing).
69 See generally Maher & Stris supra note 49 (describing costs and 
uncertainties associated with offering benefits).
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of the individual markets, however, the inability of many employees 
(including management personnel) to obtain insurance outside the workplace 
was a strong incentive for employers to offer insurance as way to attract 
workers. Yet if workers could obtain insurance easily on the ACA individual 
exchanges, employers might feel less pressure to offer health insurance.  
Whether an employer deciding to drop EB insurance is actually undesirable 
is a separate matter (see below), but the structure of the Act (as well as one 
unmade change) functioned to forestall any migration to individual markets.
The employer mandate. The Act requires large employers to offer 
health insurance to its workers or pay a penalty.70 Importantly, the point of 
this mandate is very different than the individual mandate.  The individual 
mandate was designed to ensure that the individual insurance market did not 
suffer collapse or severe impairment.  See IV.A. above.
The employer mandate (as written) serves an entirely different end.  
Large employers—who use a group of employees as the insurance 
purchasing unit—do not face problems procuring insurance, because 
insurers do not face significant problems underwriting and pricing such 
policies.71 Thus, unlike the individual mandate, an employer mandate is not 
needed to improve the pool and stabilize the market. Instead, the employer 
mandate was apparently intended to perpetuate the pre-ACA system of EB 
health insurance. Given the ACA’s anticipated creation of a functioning 
individual market, legislators wanted to discourage employers from 
abandoning EB insurance, and the employer mandate was one way of doing 
so.72
EB tax-bias preserved. EB health insurance is tax-advantaged; 
while employers may deduct the cost of the insurance from their income, 
employees do not pay tax on the value of the insurance.73 In contrast, 
                                                                                                                
70 See I.R.C. §4980H(a)(1) (2012) (penalty for large employers not 
offering health insurance).  A large employer employs 51 or more persons.
71 Large group rating either resembles community rating or is otherwise 
achievable through standard underwriting methods.  
72 In addition, the Act contained an unusual feature: its much-touted 
requirement that insurance policies cover “essential health benefits” did not
apply to large group plans. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (2012) (“essential health 
benefits” obligation does not reach large employers). Sparing large 
employers the obligation to offer policies with essential health benefits 
effectively permits them to whittle down the cost of the mandate by offering 
narrower policies than what exchange insurers must offer.   
73 See Stephen Utz, The Affordable Care Act and Tax Policy, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 1213, 1233-34 (2012) (explaining disparate tax treatment of EB and 
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purchasing health insurance on the individual market is generally done with 
after-tax dollars—even if an employer wished to give an employee money 
for that express purpose.74 All things equal, an employee who pays any 
income tax would prefer to receive insurance through her employer. 
Although it changed many things, the ACA did not abolish the tax-
bias in favor of EB insurance.75 While it does award a sliding subsidy to 
                                                                                                                
individual insurance). Scheduled to go in effect in 2020, however, is a so-
called “Cadillac” tax—a 40% excise tax—on high-cost EB insurance. 26 
U.S.C. § 4980I (2012).  
74 Utz, supra note 73, at 1233-34. The federal government has routinely 
rejected efforts to use any version of defined contribution health accounts to 
funnel an employee pre-tax money to spend on premiums outside of group 
coverage. See, e.g., Application of Mkt. Reform & Other Provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act to HRAs, Health FSAs, & Certain Other Employer 
Healthcare Arrangements, 2013-40 I.R.B. 288 (2013) (“In the HRA FAQs, 
the Departments state that an HRA is not integrated with primary health 
coverage offered by an employer unless, under the terms of the HRA, the 
HRA is available only to employees who are covered by primary group health 
plan coverage that is provided by the employer and that meets the annual dollar 
limit prohibition.”). See also generally Amy Monahan, The Use of Section 125 
Plans for Individual Insurance Following the Enactment of Federal Health 
Reform, SHARE FOUNDATION (Oct. 2014), https://www.phs.wakehealth.edu/ 
public/pub_insurance/125/125_plans_and_PPACA_formatv3%20revised.pdf 
(describing limits of using cafeteria plans to purchase individual exchange 
polices with pre-tax dollars). That said, in late 2016 Congress provided small 
employers with a limited ability to enable workers to purchase individual 
policies with pre-tax dollars.  See Stephen Miller, New Law Lets Small 
Employers Use Stand-Alone Health Reimbursement Arrangements, https:// 
www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/21st-century-cures-
act-stand-alone-hras.aspx (last updated Feb. 2, 2017) (describing new QSEHRA 
option).
75 Observers have long complained that the tax code does not treat 
insurance purchases equally. Some have argued all health insurance 
purchases should be with after tax dollars, while others have argued that all 
health insurance purchase should be with pre-tax dollars. See Bradley W. 
Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the Tax 
Treatment of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1229, 1255 (1995) (arguing that the health insurance market will only be 
efficient if all purchases are made with after tax dollars); REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
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exchange purchasers at or near the federal poverty level, for most employees, 
losing EB health insurance would result in losing a significant tax break.
That, in turn, meant labor pressure on employers to preserve EB insurance 
would remain significant.  In contrast, had Congress, in enacting health 
reform, simply treated all health insurance purchases equally—whether 
eliminating the tax break or applying it to all insurance purchases—the 
market pressure on employers to offer EB health insurance would have 
decreased considerably, and increased the influx of people onto the 
individual exchanges.
The result of the foregoing is that the ACA was both a revolutionary 
and conservative statute at once.  It was revolutionary in its efforts to fix 
individual insurance markets around the country.  It was conservative in its 
efforts to preserve the basic system of EB insurance that preceded the ACA, 
and took steps to ensure that neither employers nor employees could easily 
migrate from EB health insurance to the exchanges.  I next consider if and 
whether the ACA’s pro-EB measures should be modified.
V. UNLOCKING EXCHANGE INSURANCE
In this Part V I make two claims.  First, I argue that, on balance, 
individual exchanges like those created by the ACA are superior to EB health 
insurance.  That said, EB health insurance has some features with positive 
social value.  Second, I argue that, a sensible choice for Congress is to 
“unlock” the ACA’s individual exchanges, i.e., to eliminate or modify the 
employer mandate and the EB tax-bias so as to promote the migration of 
employed persons to the individual exchanges.  
A. THE PRELIMINARY CASE FOR UNLOCKING   
The case for EB health insurance is a comparative one.  One must 
ask not only how EB health insurance does against leaving people to fend 
for themselves in individual markets (against which it obviously compares 
well), but also against some other type of government intervention in the 
health insurance market—whether a single-payer system or insurance 
through regulated exchanges.  Of course, the ACA chose to implement an 
exchange-based intervention while attempting to prevent migration into it 
                                                                                                                
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 81 (2005), available 
at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-
Tax-System-2005.pdf (recommending that individuals be allowed to purchase 
health insurance with pre-tax dollars up to a specified amount).
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from an EB system.  The most obvious comparison to make is between the 
current segregated EB system and one in which migration from EB to the 
exchanges is not constrained.  
Group advantage. Compared to an unregulated market, the chief 
advantage of an EB system is that it gives employed individuals access to 
insurance (and thus health care) unobtainable on the individual market.  The 
creation of community-rated, subsidized exchanges solves that problem.76
Sophisticated actors. A second advantage of EB health insurance 
was that employees could benefit from having management act as a 
bargaining agent; management is more sophisticated than individual 
employees, and management purchases insurance for a large group, which 
means insurance companies could be more willing to offer terms that are, 
objectively speaking, better than what an individual could secure through the 
exchange.  This advantage is one that critics of EB health insurance would 
be wise to not dismiss.  Large employers—both as a result of controlling a 
large group of insureds and heightened sophistication—may very well strike 
insurance deals that employees would be hard pressed to obtain on their own. 
Reasonable evidence suggests that average EB health policies are more 
generous (in terms of percentage of actuarial value) than most exchange 
policies.77 And there is also evidence that EB policies offer more desirable 
doctor networks.78 That said, there are several countervailing considerations.  
                                                                                                                
76 And, of course, from society’s perspective, it solves the problem of 
coverage for those not employed.  But that happens even when there is a wall 
between the EB and individual exchange world.
77 The average EB policy, in terms of actuarial value, likely falls between 
gold and platinum exchange policies.  See generally Thomas G. Moehrle, 
Measuring the Generosity of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans: An 
Actuarial-Value Approach, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (June 2015), available at
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/measuring-the-generosity-of-
employer-sponsored-health-plans.pdf.  Most exchange policies, in contrast, 
are silver or bronze. March 31, 2016 Effectuated Enrollment Snapshot,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 31, 2016), https:/
/www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase /Fact-sheets/2016-Fact-
sheets-items/2016-06-30.html (reporting that enrollment in bronze and silver 
policies was, respectively, 22% and 70%).
78 Mark A. Hall & Paul Fronstin, Narrow Provider Networks for 
Employer Plans, 428 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 3-4 (Dec. 14, 2016) (reporting 
that exchange policies had narrower doctor networks than EB policies), https:// 
www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_428.Pvdr-Nets.13Dec16.pdf.
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First, the most likely explanation for why EB insurance is more 
generous than exchange insurance is because EB dollars go farther.  If one 
wants to get the best possible insurance for some set cost, then one will be 
able to get better insurance spending pre-tax rather than post-tax dollars. 
Second, two salient characteristics about EB policies are worth 
considering, given the potential disadvantage they could work to employee 
interests.  As discussed in Part III.C above, employers have some measure 
of religious freedom to refuse to provide policies with certain terms.  
Contraception was the first flash point, but there could easily be others 
relating to any number of controversial conditions or treatments.79
In addition, virtually all EB policies are governed by ERISA, 
whereas state law governs individual policies.80 Although ERISA was 
intended to protect beneficiaries, it has long been interpreted by the federal 
judiciary to do anything but.81 ERISA permits benefit determinations to be 
heard by conflicted decision-makers; requires exhaustion of internal appeals 
before suit; allows plans to shorten statutes of limitation; requires judicial 
deference to plan administrators—even when those administrators are 
conflicted or have already erred; and does not permit the recovery of 
consequential or punitive damages on benefit claims.82 Although that is a 
feature of federal law, not employer negotiating behavior, it closely 
resembles the very things an employer and insurance company (both of 
whom are defendants in benefit claims) would include as terms in a policy.  
State law is, generally speaking, far more favorable to claimants.
Third, perhaps the lesser quality of the policies on the exchanges 
may be the consequence of something other than the absence of employer 
involvement.  Specifically, exchange policies may be less generous because 
the pool of individuals participating in the exchanges is smaller and sicker 
than originally predicted.  That would lead to fewer insurers participating, 
and for participating insurers being stingier in the terms they were willing to 
offer.  The worse-than-expected pool quality has at least two causes: first, 
the penalty for violating the individual mandate was not high enough.83
                                                                                                                
79 See supra note 54.
80 See Maher, supra note 56, at 662 (explaining that state law is generally 
more beneficiary friendly than ERISA).
81 Id. (describing ERISA) (“[O]ne of the most effective pieces of federal 
litigation reform legislation ever passed.”). 
82 Id. at 661 (explaining limits on ERISA’s remedies).
83 See Bre Payton, Watch Obamacare’s Architect Reveal His Master 
Plan To Fix The Law: Bigger Penalties, THE FEDERALIST (Oct. 28, 2016), 
http://thefederalist.com/2016/10/26/obamacare-architect-reveals-plan-to-
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Second, the employer mandate and the tax-bias artificially prevented 
millions of healthy people from migrating to the exchanges.
Imagine if, tomorrow, employment-based health insurance was 
forbidden, and all those insureds had to purchase policies on the exchanges 
or face a meaningful penalty.  The individual market pools would
collectively swell by 150 million people—leading, no doubt, to more 
insurers offering policies.  Policies with desirable terms would attract large 
numbers of insureds, which means the exchange would see offerings closer 
to what large employers might have offered.  Barring EB health insurance, 
of course, will never happen.  But while, say, eliminating the employer 
mandate and the tax-bias would not necessarily result in a total migration to 
the exchanges, one imagines the migration would be significant enough to 
make the exchange offerings meaningfully better than they are today.
Behavioral economics. Another advantage of EB health insurance 
was that connecting health insurance to employment was desirable for 
behavioral reasons; it prevented employees from making cognitive errors 
they would make if left on their own.  Yet the mandate and the exchanges 
address a significant number of these concerns.  Some of the central 
behavioral difficulties afflicting insurance purchasing are that it addresses a 
future contingent need; it is a difficult good to value; and the many choices 
available to an unguided consumer might be so overwhelming as to paralyze 
the consumer into doing nothing or relying on an inefficient heuristic.  See
Part III.B above.
The mandate requires insurance be bought, and the exchange makes 
the purchasing process close-ended and constrained: one need check one 
website to see all the options, and the options are described in uniform, 
reasonably accessible terms.84 Purchasing assistance is also available.85
Admittedly, compared to a company purchaser, an exchange consumer still 
may use an inefficient heuristic, but that problem could be addressed in two 
ways.  First, a default option could, by inertia, limit any decision-making 
(and thus limit bad decision-making).  Second, plain English “FAQs” 
prepared by the exchange could steer those consumers who opt to move away 
from the default away from making decisional errors.  Third, there is also no 
                                                                                                                
fix-the-law-bigger-penalties/ (economist Jonathan Gruber arguing in favor 
of higher penalty as a means to draw more healthy people into the exchange 
pool).
84 See Maher, supra note 68, at 1108 (discussing how the exchanges were 
designed to promote simple and transparent choices).  
85 Id. (noting availability of a toll-free hotline and knowledgeable 
intermediaries the Act calls “Navigators”).  
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reason an employer might not offer an advice benefit; i.e., instead of 
choosing, procuring, and providing health insurance; the employer’s experts 
would simply analyze the yearly exchange options and make 
recommendations for which plan it would have provided, were it doing the 
buying.  
One EB advantage that is not readily apparent on the exchanges, 
however, is constrained compensation.  Most EB health insurance includes 
some compensation that is only available to the worker if he elects to be on 
the company policy; otherwise, that money (or some of it) stays with the 
company.   As explained above, that operates like a commitment device; a 
worker accepting a position with a company knows that some portion of his 
compensation must go toward health insurance or be forfeited.  The 
exchanges lack such a feature. Any dollar not spent on the exchange for 
insurance can be used for something else.
Regulatory amenability. A regulatory advantage of the EB system 
is that it draped itself onto a pre-existing web of players to achieve its effects.  
And while the ACA illustrates the enormous effort and difficulty in creating 
a new structure—i.e., comprehensible, subsidized, community-rated 
exchanges—once that structure has been created, there is little regulatory 
advantage in preventing EB participants from flowing into it.  The regulatory 
cost of additional participants is small.86 Moreover, because the exchanges 
cut out the employer as middleman, the relationship will not only be easier 
to regulate, but the regulations will be targeted at providers of health 
insurance, who, relative to employers, can make a less credible threat about 
refusing to offer health insurance in response to consumer protective 
legislation.87
                                                                                                                
86 It may even be negative.  If healthier people flood the exchanges, the 
average cost of a policy should decrease, which could reduce the subsidy the 
government extends to low-income exchange purchasers.
87 See Sam Solomon, Health Exchange Federalism: Striking the Balance 
Between State Flexibility and Consumer Protection in ACA Implementation,
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2083-89 (2013) (examining the success of 
several insurance exchanges). Current insurer refusals to participate in some 
exchanges markets are likely attributable to the small, sick pools in those 
exchanges. See Mark A. Hall, Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye 
of the Beholder, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (2014) (explaining reasons 
why insurers would leave the exchanges); Tom Murphy, Insurers Continue 
to Abandon ACA Exchanges, Limiting Choices, U.S. NEWS & WORD REP.
(Aug. 16, 2016, 3:42 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/
articles/2016-08-16/insurer-aetna-slashes-aca-exchange-participation-to-4-
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Opacity. Finally, relaxing the pro-EB restrictions would do much to 
combat the confused view workers and stakeholders have regarding who 
pays for health insurance and the implicit connection some might believe 
exists between having a job with benefits and whether society should make 
insurance available.  
That health insurance has a cost, and that in an EB system workers 
pay for it with foregone wages, is an economic reality that it is essential to 
convey.  Stakeholder failure to internalize that reality means all reform that 
moves the nation away from EB health insurance will be perceived as a move 
away from a system that grants employees a gift.  If opening up the 
exchanges has the effect of employers dropping insurance, wage theory 
predicts that the wages of workers at those companies would rise (although 
those workers would then have to buy insurance on the exchange).  For 
employers that continued to offer health insurance, wages would be 
comparatively less, and it would be difficult for the public to avoid seeing, 
by experience, the connection between wages and health insurance, and that 
EB health insurance (whatever its other merits) is not free for employees.88
B. OBJECTIONS TO UNLOCKING
Stability concerns. One reason to keep EB insurance is because the 
ACA reforms of the individual market might take some time to result in 
stable markets.  Whatever the flaws of EB health insurance, it was reasonably 
stable.  Ensuring its preservation by restricting the ability of EB players to 
effect a migration into the exchange markets until after they were stabilized 
and/or flaws were rectified makes caution the better part of valor.  
                                                                                                                
states (insurers abandon exchanges due to inability to sign up enough healthy 
insureds). 
In fact, they continue to sell policies to employers. Interestingly, a 
federal judge recently held that Aetna’s withdrawal from the individual 
exchanges was motivated by a desire to obtain leverage over the government 
in connection with obtaining approval of a pending merger, as opposed to an 
inability to make money on the exchanges. Michael Hiltzik, U.S. Judge 
Finds that Aetna Deceived the Public About Its Reasons for Quitting 
Obamacare, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:00 PM) http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-aetna-obamacare-20170123-story.html.
88 The point is not that this move would be free of political cost; the point 
is that the political cost would come with the benefit of educating 
stakeholders about economic reality.  I realize that current times may favor 
neither education nor reality.
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Ultimately, this objection is sensible, although it depends on empirical 
judgments, and comes with a time limit.  
That said, the reported problems with the exchange markets largely 
revolve around them having too few and too sick people.89 Undertaking 
reforms that make it more likely that some of the comparatively healthy 
employed people would participate in the exchanges is likely to stabilize the 
exchange markets, not topple them.  Indeed, even if reformers are committed 
to eliminating the individual mandate, finding other mechanisms to use in 
the exchange markets to ensure they remained stable and accessible would 
be easier if the exchange markets had more, and healthier, employees; it 
might take time to see which combination of mechanisms could work.90
Compensation concerns. Another reason to preserve EB health 
insurance might be that companies dropping EB coverage will not raise 
wages an equivalent amount, or will not do so with respect to more 
vulnerable segments of the working population.  While that fear may prove 
unlikely in the long run, in the short term, many workers could be worse 
off.91
One way to address this concern is to alter the mandate by permitting 
employers to satisfy it not only by offering insurance, but also by offering a 
stipend sufficient to buy a policy of some specified value (e.g., the median 
                                                                                                                
89 See sources cited supra note 87.
90 Some may object that I am failing to sufficiently appreciate the chaos 
of a large migration from EB to the individual exchanges.  Perhaps; but it 
seems unlikely there is not some way to affect that migration—and benefit 
the exchanges with healthier people—in a way that would be less disruptive 
and worth the candle of largely removing employers from a system they have 
served in long enough.   
91 Workers being worse off would be counterbalanced (in welfare but not 
distributional terms) by the employer being better off, as money saved via 
compensation reduction would stay with the company.  With respect to the 
relationship between wages and benefits, and the reaction of the former to 
the elimination of the latter, I do not intend to imply the real-world 
economics of that are simple.  But it would be surprising if compensation-
equilibrium theory were utterly mistaken. Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of 
Equalizing Differences, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 641 (Orley 
Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986) (identifying tradeoff between 
benefits and wages).
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gold policy) on the exchange.92 I consider the effects of using such a 
compensation protection mechanism in Part VI.A. below.
Underinsurance concerns. The role of individual choice in health 
insurance is controversial.  One side (“choice advocates”) offers classic 
arguments in favor of choice: choice is a good in and of itself; individual 
choice is most likely to lead to optimal outcomes because individuals best 
know their own preferences; and even individual choice that leads to bad 
outcomes is desirable because it serves as a necessary feedback mechanism 
for creating within citizens a sense of personal responsibility.   The other side 
(“choice reformers”) offers behavioral arguments that unconstrained choice 
often does not, on balance, maximize welfare, and that therefore 
considerable care must go into limiting or guiding individual choice such 
that choice is preserved, but the likelihood of bad choices is meaningfully 
reduced.
Choice advocates will likely see exchanges as preferable to EB 
insurance.  Although many employers offer some choice regarding 
insurance, those choices are fewer than what would be available on healthy 
exchanges.  
Choice reformers might be more cautious, and particularly with 
respect to the possibility of underinsurance bias. Because employers likely 
have a superior understanding of risk and discounting, it seems they would 
be more likely to properly value (and thus buy more of) insurance than would 
an individual on his own, even if she faces the comprehensible and 
constrained choices an exchange offers.  Put differently, while the exchanges 
significantly improve the ability of an individual to make an insurance 
purchasing decision, they might not sufficiently counter the inclination of
the individual to purchase less insurance than is optimal. 
Even granting the employer is not an ideal agent, its involvement 
might end up leaving most employees with more insurance than they would 
have if they were choosing to spend the money on their own, where, 
assuming average risk preferences, the optimal choice for an employee 
would be more, not less, insurance.   In that case, even though the employer 
is otherwise imperfect, it will generally avoid purchasing the cheapest, least 
protective insurance, because it realizes that is not the best trade-off between 
price and risk; in contrast, an unguided exchange purchaser might overly 
prioritize low cost to the detriment to future risk.
Choice advocates might either deny this outcome—by insisting that 
the employee is a better determiner of his own preferences—or tolerate it as 
                                                                                                                
92 How that minimum stipend would be calculated is no simple matter, 
but the details of doing so are not insurmountable.  
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a necessary consequence of the virtue of choice.  But choice reformers might 
worry that moving away from the EB system might eliminate a meaningful 
paternalistic result.  If individuals are inclined to severely underinsure, and 
EB insurance reduces or eliminates that problem, then the other negatives of 
EB health insurance might be worth the price, and barriers to prevent 
migration away from EB health insurance make objective sense. I consider 
potential ways to deal with this concern below.
VI. TWO REFORM POSSIBILITIES
In this Part VI, I consider two reform possibilities that center on 
relaxing the anti-migration features of present law.  Both suggestions rest 
upon the idea that permitting a meaningful portion of the employed to 
participate in the exchanges would have salutary effects, particularly if 
measures were taken to preserve certain desirable features of traditional EB 
approaches.  In both cases, while I sketch out the contours of the suggested 
reforms and consider their merits, I by design leave important 
implementation details for resolution in later work. 
A. A DIFFERENT KIND OF EMPLOYER MANDATE 
The reform proposed below is based on the intuition that while 
unlocking the individual exchanges is on balance attractive, we may wish to 
do so in a way that replicates some of the advantages an EB approach 
confers.   Before discussing the proposal, I briefly note those advantages.
First, I suspect that providing employers with an incentive to offer 
health insurance makes it considerably more likely that employees will have 
health insurance than a pure exchange-based system, even one with stronger 
penalties than today.   Management personnel benefits (and know they 
benefit) from having health insurance, so having in place legal rules that 
encourage them to do so—while requiring that their doing equally benefits 
their workers—is a more effective tool to increase the number of insureds 
than people commonly realize.  An employer benefit is a powerful default—
even when (and this is never the case) the benefit could be turned down in 
return for the total cash value of the benefit.  It takes a lot of the work out of 
an otherwise complicated choice; it brings the issue directly to mind; and it 
operates as a ready default (rather than the exchanges, which depend on a 
penalty to stir affirmative action).  In addition, it seems likely that employers 
are less likely to underinsure than employees, see above.  There is a way, 
however, to (somewhat) leverage these EB advantages without requiring 
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employers to offer insurance.  (The way I suggest below also addresses 
concerns that migration to the exchanges will result in workers’ 
compensation dropping.)
The animating idea is to convert the mandate into a funding mandate, 
that is, give employers the option of funding, for all fulltime employees, an 
exchange purchase account with an annual stipend equal to an amount set by 
the employer, but at no less than some minimum tied to buying a median 
value policy on the exchange.  If no policy is purchased, the money returns 
to the company.  If a less expensive policy is purchased, treat the difference 
between the policy price and stipend as taxable income to the employee.  If 
a more expensive policy is purchased, require the additional price be paid 
with after-tax dollars.
The benefit of this approach is manifold.  First, although it obligates 
employers to continue to “pay” for EB insurance, it frees them from any 
meaningful administrative or legal obligations—which, under both ERISA 
and the ACA, are significant.  It would also prevent compensation declines, 
because, for companies that already are offering EB insurance, it amounts to 
little more than funding employee accounts with money that would have 
otherwise been paid to an insurance company.93 And not only would it make 
salient to employees the cost of health insurance, it would ensure that the 
collective foregone wages of the employees used to buy health insurance 
would—just as if the company obtained a group policy—redound to the 
benefit of all employees equally.94    Finally, if the employer mandate was 
ever lifted, companies that declined to offer exchange purchasing accounts 
(or health insurance) but did not raise wages would face immediate 
competitive pressure.  It is easy for employees to realize their compensation 
has been cut when their exchange purchasing accounts go from having 
thousands of dollars in them to zero.
Second, it ties the insurance fortunes of labor to those of 
management while discouraging management to be stingy.  A lower stipend 
denies all employees a tax-advantage when purchasing a more generous 
policy, and that tax-advantage is most valuable to highly compensated 
                                                                                                                
93 It will, of course, lead to wage reductions for those companies that had 
not previously offered health insurance.  But that is true of the current 
employer mandate.
94 One problem with relying on wages to rise if benefits are reduced is 
that the collective rise in wages might not be evenly distributed among
employees.  While that might not be a bad thing in terms of market 
efficiency, it might constitute an undesirable outcome for some on 
distributional grounds.
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employees—such as management—which would incline them to set the size 
of the purchase account stipend with care.
Third, it is constrained compensation: the forfeiture and tax 
consequences of an employee purchasing a less generous policy combat an 
inclination to underinsure.   At the same time, it would still allow for worker 
choice, but in a constrained, intelligible setting: through the exchanges.  
Fourth, it imposes a tax on purchasers who want to buy a policy more 
generous than the company funds.  The size of this tax would of course 
depend on the degree to which individuals purchased policies more generous 
than could be purchased with the company stipend.
This would undoubtedly swell the ranks of the exchanges and attract 
insurer participation that would lead to more and better policy offerings.   
Few employers would continue to provide, rather than fund, EB health 
insurance, as they would have little incentive to endure the hassle of doing 
so.  Indeed, the likely enormous influx of the employed into the individual 
exchanges, combined with defaulting all non-employed into exchange 
policies and strictly limiting sign up periods,95 might very well make the 
exchange pools healthy and deep enough such that the individual mandate 
would be unnecessary to ensure stable markets.96 And the above could be 
combined with a federalism twist: states could be given the freedom to 
abolish the individual mandate.97
                                                                                                                
95See Allison Bell, 6 ACA Individual Mandate Replacement Ideas, 
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2017/01/24/6-
aca-individual-mandate-replacement-ideas?page=2&slreturn=1485733601. The 
idea is that defaulting those without EB insurance into exchange policies will 
improve the exchange pool because most individuals will be insufficiently 
motivated to decline a policy they are defaulted into.  After all, they are not 
paying for nothing; they actually get insurance.  The more costly the value 
of the policy people are defaulted into, of course, the more likely they are to 
modify the default.  Proposals that would default people into non-exchange 
policies will not be useful to improving the exchange pool, obviously.  See 
generally Joseph Antos et al., Improving Health and Health Care: An 
Agenda for Reform, AM. ENTER. INST., (2015), http://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Improving-Health-and-Health-Care-online.pdf.
96 I am meaningfully skeptical that this is the case; keeping the mandate 
would be better.  But I do not share the profound distaste for the mandate 
those currently in power do.  
97 Senators Collins and Cassidy suggested a reform proposal that gave 
States freedom to pursue various reform options, including keeping or 
rejecting the individual mandate. Press Release, Sen. Susan Collins, Cassidy 
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B. NO MANDATES AT ALL (MAYBE)
A second possibility would be to eliminate the employer mandate, 
but use the tax-differential and management’s self-interest as a way to 
motivate employers to fund exchange purchasing accounts for employees.   
Under this approach, no employer would be obligated to provide insurance 
or an exchange purchasing account; however, only insurance received 
through the workplace or acquired with an exchange purchasing account 
would be treated tax-preferentially, i.e., paid-for with pre-tax dollars.  
While this would perpetuate the uneven treatment between EB and 
non-EB insurance purchases, it would drive some number of employees onto 
the exchanges, because many employers—not only to curry employee favor, 
but also to secure for management a tax break on its health insurance—would 
wish to fund exchange purchasing accounts in lieu of offering traditional 
health insurance.  Although less employees would end up in the exchanges 
than under the proposal above, it might add to the exchanges a sufficient 
number of healthy workers that, combined with default enrollment of non-
EB insureds and other measures, the need for an individual mandate might 
be avoided, or, as above, left to the decision of state officials.
This approach might raise two concerns.  First, it does nothing to 
protect labor from losing some or all of a preexisting health insurance 
benefit; a company would be free to neither offer health insurance nor an 
exchange purchasing account, and workers losing health insurance would 
have to rely on market forces to replace their lost benefit with higher wages.  
Second, no employer mandate means no floor on the purchasing account 
amount an employer could establish; to the extent that some employers 
funded accounts insufficient to buy a level of policy society deems to reflect 
the proper amount of insurance, individual inclinations to underinsure would 
be free to operate.  While an inclination to underinsure might be 
insufficiently strong to motivate a worker to move from a generous employer 
default to a bare bones policy, that inclination would certainly prevent a 
                                                                                                                
Introduce Comprehensive Obamacare Replacement Plan (Jan. 23, 2017), 
available at https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/cassidy-collins-
introduce-comprehensive-obamacare-replacement-plan.  For a terrific and lucid 
discussion the appeal and limits of appeal of federalism in the health care context, 
see Nicholas J. Bagley, Federalism and the End of ObamaCare, Yale Law Review 
Forum, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/federalism-and-the-end-ofobama 
care.
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converse move.  On the other hand, if less generous insurance was in general 
purchased, that would save the public treasury money, because the tax 
expenditure would be smaller.  In addition, if one believes, as many 
economists do, that the tax break leads people to buy more insurance than is 
necessary,98 the foregoing is a boon, not a flaw.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The Affordable Care Act was so polarizing that sober discussions of 
its technical merits were rare and incomplete; too often it was simply cast as 
divine or diabolical and praised or cursed accordingly. Such dramatic 
appraisals make for good politics and entertaining television; and the election 
of Donald J. Trump suggests the latter and the former are one and the same.  
But the world is more than politics, and the fact that—depending on 
the whims of President Trump—the ACA may be wiped off the books does 
not mean scholarly attention should be permanently directed elsewhere.  In 
fact, there is reason to believe that, behind closed doors, a variety of reforms 
are being seriously entertained.99 And even if the subjects and possibilities 
considered in this Article have truly been sidelined by politics, that should 
be no bar to serious scholarly debate about what should be.   Times change, 
and often faster than we expect.
                                                                                                                
98 See, e.g., Joseph R. Antos, Is There a Right Way to Promote Health 
Insurance Through the Tax System?, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 477, 478 (2006) 
(suggesting tax break leads to excessive purchase of insurance).
99 See supra note 2.
